opposition to the Communist Party, intermittent efforts to set up independent labor unions, the blitzkrieg challenge by Falun Gong, the quiet spread of criminal organizations, and the ever-increasing frequency and size of collective protests nationwide jointly challenge the authority and legitimacy of the Communist regime.
While there is a fast-growing literature on this theme, much of it ends up echoing the same argument that societal challenges are becoming increasingly serious to the extent that not only effective governance but even regime survival may be at risk. Problematic is the fact that many of these assessments are made on the basis of fragmented and anecdotal evidence without providing systematic and empirical grounds for their claims. 2 This article seeks to fill the void by tackling the descriptive questions concerning where social instability originates and how it has evolved over time, particularly since the 1990s.
This study focuses upon three dimensions of social instability in China: (1) intensifying popular-both rural and urban-protests as a manifest challenge to state authority; (2) the rise of "unofficial" religious groups that continue to flourish despite the government's conscious efforts to curtail them; and (3) the expanding criminal networks that defy the law and undermine the state's governance capacity. While each of these three dimensions is crucial in itself, they may also jointly threaten political and social stability-with religious sects providing "spiritual guidance" and criminal organizations offering grass-roots collusion and logistics to intensify the impact of large-scale collective protests.
Chinese history is replete with cases where religious sects became rallying points and even platforms for organized forces to confront the state. Religious sects-often combined with secret societies and criminal organizations-were the main driving force for the Yellow Eyebrow Rebellion that seriously undermined the Former Han, the Red Turban Rebellion that toppled the Yuan, and the White Lotus and Taiping Rebellions that shook up the Qing Imperial Court. Secret societies-often consisting of criminal elements-also took on a crucial role as social protestors. Despite repeated crackdowns and restrictions, autonomous Catholic and Christian churches and sects of all types have survived state suppression for centuries, including the total ban on all religions during the Cultural Revolution. 4 It can be argued that religious sects are among the best-organized groups and pose one of the most endurable challenges to the Chinese state. China has also undergone a significant increase of criminality in both the state and society. It may be under the double curse of both the Leninist ideological legacies that led to Russian-style Mafiyas and the more traditional "black gold politics" (heijin zhengzhi) that exist in Taiwan. 5 In addition to religious movements and criminal activities, socially motivated urban and rural protests have steadily increased in frequency, expanded in size, diversified in terms of their participants' backgrounds, enlarged in geographical coverage, lasted longer and displayed higher levels of violence. Furthermore, collective protests are forming lateral linkages among different localities, religious sects and criminal organizations. For these reasons, surveying the horizon of social instability along the three dimensions is both timely and worthwhile.
As Ted R. Gurr and his associates pointed out almost three decades ago in their analysis of the "crime-conflict nexus", the three dimensions do interact. 6 Organized crime and collective protests share common structural causes, reflect many similar social ills and create the same challenge to and therefore often elicit common response from the state. 7 To a considerable extent, collective protestors are contending with the ruling Party and the regime for moral authority; the religious sects for spiritual guidance; and the organized crime groups for supremacy within a community or an industry. They take advantage of and foster tensions between the Chinese political superstructure and the social infrastructure. Managing all these three contentions thus constitutes an essential step to maintain social and political stability. 8 The remainder of this article consists of six sections. The first surveys the major trends of social instability by focusing on empirical indicators and statistics of popular protest in China. The second traces the growth of "unlawful" sects and their challenges to the state. The third provides discussion of expanding criminal organizations and their impact on governance in China. The fourth deals with the regional distribution of social instability. The fifth examines the formation of horizontal linkages and interconnectedness among these three sources of societal challenges. The last section explores some crucial implications for legitimacy and governance in China.
A brief discussion of data problems is necessary. While a few excellent micro-studies have revealed grass-roots dynamics at villages and townships, 9 it is difficult to get a hold of systematic data on organized protests at the national or even provincial level. One key reason rests with the fact that much of the necessary data-at the national and local levels-belongs to a non-accessible realm of "secrets".
10 This secrecy might reflect that societal challenges are so prevalent and serious that all relevant data need to be fully contained. Despite this secrecy, various published documents and online materials are very useful-if not wholly satisfactory-in reconstructing the overall trend of organized protests.
The data on religious sects have similar problems. Much of the data published in China focuses on officially-accepted religions. A number of existing academic studies focus on localized and folk religions which have won acquiescence and even support from local officials. These religions, however, fall outside the purview of this article. Some overseas news reports and publications in China refer to localized mystic sects and even considerably larger sects 8 Listed in The Criminal Law of China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa, 1979, revised in 1997) are offenses of disturbing public and social order; assembling a crowd to disturb public order; illegal demonstration and parade; offenses against public security; organizing and joining in terrorist groups; organizing, leading and joining organized criminal groups; organizing and using evil cults and superstitious sects to undermine law enforcement and public order, and so on. outlawed by the state, but little information is provided on their active time framework, location and the size of followings.
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Data on religious sects in this study includes two primary types. First are the data published in China on the religious sects that are regarded as heretical, dangerous, disruptive and suppressed or outlawed by the Chinese government. Second are overseas reports on underground Christian and Catholic churches and large and organized Buddhist, Daoist and folk religious sects that defy the state's control. These data and reports contain specific and useful information on the variety, scale, influence, and operation of various religions and sects that pose serious challenges to the state.
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The Chinese government has released more data on crimes based on the assumption that crimes are less political and, therefore, the revelation of crime data poses less direct a challenge to its authority and legitimacy. The Ministry of Public Security is the primary source for the data on crime. The public security apparatus has nevertheless been carefully concealing several key pieces of information, preventing outside observers from reconstructing longitudinal trends and national-level data. The best alternatives have been cross-examining national data with provincial data and comparing accumulated data with yearly figures.
Popular Protests
The indicator for popular protest used here is that of "collective public security incidents" (quntixing zhian shijian). According to the official definition, "collective public security incidents" (hereafter CoPSI) refer to incidents in which "a group of people illegally gather to disrupt public order and destroy public properties". Generally, the term denotes incidents involving more than five protesters. When more than 500 people are involved in an incident it is called a "large-scale CoPSI" (daguimo quntixing shijian).
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The data on the frequency of CoPSI are available for a period of twelve years (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , with the exception of 2001. 15 In 1999, the number of CoPSI in which more than 1,000 people participated was 125. In May 2004 alone, the number of CoPSI in which more than 500 people took part was 2,180, constituting 68 per cent of all CoPSI. 16 The increased frequency and size of CoPSI have much to do with the widening (occupational) base of social instability. Contrary to the general belief that discontents are confined to a few specific social strata, CoPSI have involved increasingly large sections of the population. National-level data for 2000 indicate that half of the CoPSI participants lived in the countryside while urban residents made up 34 per cent. 17 Urban CoPSI participants were not limited to workers; intellectuals, private entrepreneurs, taxi drivers, former PLA soldiers, and even civil servants joined CoPSI. 18 Even when we focus solely on urban workers, the CoPSI participants were not confined to dismissed or retired workers: an increasingly large number of "laid-off workers" (xiagang gongren) have also joined in. CoPSI have also become more violent in recent years. While peaceful protests in the forms of "sit-ins" (jingzuo), "petitions" (qingyuan) and "rallies" (jihui) still take place, these types of protests have become increasingly rare. Crucial challenges are posed by those CoPSI that turn violent by (1) blocking and destroying public transportation facilities (zusai jiaotong); (2) encircling and attacking government buildings and officials (chongji weigong); and (3) fasting and committing suicides in public. 20 These violent incidents appear to be growing nationwide. The incidents classified as "encircling and attacking" governmental offices increased from 2,700 in 2000 to 3,700 in 2003. In 2003, there were over 3,100 blockages of public roads and railways. 21 Local data also suggest that CoPSI are becoming increasingly more violent. During 1998-99 in Hubei, 43 per cent of the largescale CoPSI entailed violent measures against public transportation and government buildings and personnel. In Jilin, the number of CoPSI that involved attacks on public transportation and government buildings and personnel rose by 2.3 times from 2000 to 2001. 22 Even direct attacks on the police have not been rare. Recent statistics for Henan, for example, reveal that the injuries and deaths of police officers in CoPSI there accounted for 25 per cent of the total injuries and deaths of all parties involved.
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Urban workers have participated in CoPSI for at least four different reasons, including economic difficulties caused by unemployment or bankruptcy, delayed salary payments, excessive taxation and surcharges, and illegal financial scams. For rural participants in CoPSI, the most important reasons have been disputes over land division and appropriation, followed by excessive taxation and irrigation rights. 24 It should be noted that as many as 90 per cent of CoPSI were considered "rightful resistance", which were triggered by the mishandling of reasonable demands. admitted that 80 per cent of mass complaints were well-grounded and unresponsive local officials were to be blamed for the protests. 25 Ill-conceived responses or even a complete lack of response to reasonable demands convinced protestors that only rough action would gain government attention and prompt immediate solution. Collective action based on such reasoning enhances the overall level of violence involved in CoPSI. Popular slogans illustrating such thinking include: "no trouble, no solution; small trouble, small solution; big trouble, generous solution" (bunao bu jiejue; xiaonao xiao jiejue; danao da jiejue); and "it's better to mess with the government than with the enterprise, but it's better to block the railway than mess with the government" (zhao qiye buru zhao zhengfu, zhao zhengfu buru du tielu).
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It should be noted that, as a matter of fact, many CoPSI seemed to have more limited and locally-based grudges and directed their demands to local or grassroots governments and cadres rather than to the central government. In some cases, the central government was viewed by CoPSI participants as a potential mediator. 27 In other cases, the discrepancy between central and local authorities in their respective view of CoPSI created room for disruptive collective action. 28 Yet, as the frequency of CoPSI has increased sharply and their geographical coverage has expanded, the overall perception of social instability has also risen.
Religious Protests
With Beijing relaxing its control over religious activities, rising socio-economic uncertainties and popular disillusionment with the Communist ideology, China has experienced a revival of religious faith, churches and sects independent of the state, especially since the late 1980s. 29 The Since the late 1980s, popular yearning for spiritual solace has increased as both local and overseas clerics have enjoyed greater leeway for missionary work inside China. As a result, the number of such independent religious organizations has increased from 12 in 1986 to 29 in the mid-1990s, peaking at 31 in 1999. Because of increased state suppression since the 1999 Falun Gong protests, the number declined to 24 or less between 2000 and 2005. Independent Buddhist, Daoist and folk religious organizations were the primary targets of the post-1999 suppression and, therefore, the number of these groups suffered the steepest decline. "Heretical Christian sects" witnessed a moderate drop from 12 to 10. The number of underground Christian churches has remained at 9 (see Figure 1 ).
31
Underground Catholic and house Christian churches survived state crackdowns in previous decades by operating secretively. They readily revived and expanded after the reinstatement of religious freedom in 1979. The number of underground Catholics (not included in Figure 1 ) ranges from five to ten million, compared to the five million members of the official Catholic church. In such areas as Baoding in Hebei and Wenzhou in Zhejiang, the independent Catholic church attracts hundreds of thousands of followers. 32 Membership of the house Christian church is estimated to be 32 million and some of these Christian groups-such as the China Fangcheng Church, the Chinese Gospels Fellowship, Some religious groups no longer exist after they were banned by the state, their top leaders arrested or placed on the state's wanted list, and their organizations dismantled. 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 The Chinese government has repeatedly cracked down on independent Catholic and Christian churches. News on the arrest of Catholic bishops, house church leaders and Christian activists are frequent. About fifty underground Catholic bishops and priests were either detained or placed under house arrest in China in early 2003 . 34 According to a report on police crackdowns in 2004, public security officers stormed a religious retreat of the Chinese Gospels Fellowship in Wuhan and arrested 100 leaders. In Anhui, 100 church leaders from Yingshang Family Church were arrested for training clerics to serve in Xinjiang.
In comparison, "heretical Christian sects" are generally smaller in size and their fate has varied widely. The Shouters Faction (Huhan Pai) already had about 200,000 followers in 1983, and retained over 50,000 followers in 1996 despite the state crackdowns. 35 The Disciples Association (Mentu Hui) had 350,000 followers during the mid-1990s. 36 Other prominent sects of the 1990s included the Established King Faction (Beili Wang) with an estimated 30,000 followers, the Spirit Church (Lingling Jiao) with 20,000 followers. Other smaller sects included the Dami Mission, the World Elijah Evangelical Mission, Children of God and the Blood and Water of Jesus Christ (Xueshui Shenling).
Some of these sects, including the Lord God Sect (Zhushen Jiao), the Established King, the Spirit Church and the Resurrection Way (Fuhuo Dao), suffered severe crackdowns and have not recovered. Others managed to survive by re-emerging as splinter groups or growing back in later years. The Shouters Faction, for example, had spread to 360 counties and cities in 20 provinces and gained 200,000 followers by 1983. After a state crackdown, it splintered into two groups, the Established King and Lord God Sects. In the mid-1990s, the Shouters Faction itself re-emerged. In Fujian alone, the sect expanded from 264 meeting sites and 16,000 followers in 1983 to 420 sites and 50,000 followers in 1996. Gong, and Cibei (Compassion) Gong also flourished during this period, worrying the Chinese state.
38
The state's effort to suppress Falun Gong has revealed the sect's strengths as well as its limits. No other sect had the audacity and organizational capacity to confront the state as Falun Gong did with its 10,000 protesters outside Zhongnanhai in April 1999. The Chinese leaders quickly learned of Falun Gong's deep infiltration into the ranks and files of the Party and government. The authorities also worried about the sect's large following, with estimates ranging from 2.1 million to as many as 100 million, according to the sect's founder. 39 Some may have feared that Falun Gong could repeat the history of the centuriesold White Lotus Sect and the Taiping Heavenly Movement during the Qing. In July 1999, the state declared Falun Gong an evil cult and banned it.
40
Falun Gong became the Chinese government's biggest headache.
41
According to official sources, from April 25 to August 1999, Falun Gong organizations arranged 307 protests in which its members besieged government buildings and news agencies. 42 In spite of the stepped-up crackdown, over thirty protests took place in Beijing in 2000, involving 7,500 protesters. 43 The central government's suppression was also compromised by local authority's expedient truce with the sect. Short of the necessary resources and coercive capabilities and yet eager to prevent local sect followers from protesting in Beijing, some localities struck deals with the sect's activists. Sect followers were allowed to
Beijing and other visible public places to protest. 
Criminal Organizations and Instability
The criminal underworld (heishehui) disappeared almost completely from the consciousness of the Chinese people during three decades of radical Maoism. In the post-Mao era, street gangs and criminal groups gradually resurged. During the 1980s, the number of criminal groups began to multiply and many evolved into criminal syndicates. 45 The years 1989-90 were a turning point when the Central Committee on Political and Legal Affairs explicitly warned about the strong comeback of criminal organizations. During the mid-1990s, many of these syndicates actively sought political protection and, subsequently, they formed criminal nexuses with many state agencies, including the police. 46 Despite the alleged uprooting of thousands of criminal groups since 2000, knowledgeable observers with inside information appear to be pessimistic as to the future situation. He Bingsong, for instance, commented that "[I]n the coming decade, criminal groups will continue to emerge voluminously. Many of them will transform themselves into criminal syndicates ... Many will expand their activities across cities and provinces. Even cross-border alliances may be formed". 47 Many in-house experts for the public security apparatus have also testified that what is known is only a tip of the iceberg. Through expansion and merger, many criminal groups have become larger. Syndicates with over 100 members are quite common. 49 In addition, many criminal groups also adopt the rituals of the traditional secret societies and, through elaborate rules and codes, built hierarchical organizations. 50 The overall level of violence involved has also increased. Punishments such as chopping off fingers, cutting the Achilles tendon and burying hostages alive are more common. The magnitude of the damage inflicted by criminal groups has been further enhanced by their acquisition of machine guns and other modern weapons. More than 2,600 police officers died on duty from 1995 to 2000. 51 Since the 1990s, many criminal groups have evolved into syndicates that seek political protection from Party and government officials. Structural changes in the economic system introduced after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992 were utilized by these crime syndicates to take advantage of the lucrative opportunities, rent-seeking and corruption available to officials. A politicalcriminal nexus has become a key feature of much Chinese criminal activity. law-enforcement and judicial agencies) or embed their bosses in state organs. 53 Law enforcement agencies in many provinces have lost their capacity and incentive to put down criminal activities by these syndicates.
From 1974 to 2000, the reported number of crimes per annum jumped from half a million to more than four million. 54 The last two decades have seen a number of "strike hard" (yanda) campaigns. 55 Between 1992 and 1999, public security agencies carried out numerous large-scale anti-crime operations and destroyed more than a million criminal groups with 3.76 million members nationwide. 56 According to Group crimes have gained prominence and pose a serious threat to China's public order. According to 1995 statistics, crimes committed by groups (rather than by individuals) accounted for 26 per cent of all solved cases, and the number of group members arrested amounted to 37 per cent of all captured criminals. The percentage was much higher in the coastal provinces where 70-80 per cent of all serious crimes were committed by gangs. 58 Table 3 shows how both the number of dismantled criminal groups and that of arrested group members grew until 1996. Since 1996, when a new round of "strike-hard campaigns" was carried out, the national figures on the destroyed organized criminal groups declined. Considering that the crime rate per one hundred thousand people jumped from 135 in 1997 to 338 in 2002 and that the total filed criminal cases increased from 1.6 million to 4.3 million, the declining numbers of destroyed criminal groups may not necessarily reflect an improvement in law and order. This suspicion is supported by statistics from Beijing and Shanghai where police forces are the most staffed and best equipped but the figures on the destroyed organized criminal groups have sustained an upward trend during the same period. through the recruitment of new members. The number of new recruits is estimated to have grown from 100,000 in 1986 to more than half a million in 1994. 60 Despite the draconian campaigns in 1996 and 2000, Cai Shaoqing estimated that the overall membership of criminal gangs in China was close to a million. 61 Considering that at least one-third of criminal acts are never reported, we believe that even this estimate is too low. . 64 It appears that poverty is not the sole motive that propels participation in CoPSI. As a matter of fact, transitional reforms are so complex and overarching that different people with varying backgrounds have their own reasons to partake in organized protests. 65 As Table 4 demonstrates, many provinces experience a high level of CoPSI. In terms of large-scale CoPSI (the far-right column), four categories of region seem particularly vulnerable. 66 The first category includes the northeastern provinces-Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang-with a heavy concentration of state-owned enterprises and commonly mentioned in government and media reports on CoPSI. 67 The second refers to those industrial bases with low levels of growth (chuantong bufada laogongye jidi) along the "Third Front" (di san xian), most notably Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan and Chongqing. The third denotes such advanced regions as Zhejiang and Jiangsu (that is, Sunan). The fourth refers to Henan, Anhui and Jiangxi with a stagnant rural economy. Woguo shehui xingshi genzong fenxi yu duice yanjiu, p. 97.
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Viewed in this light, the policy focus of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration on the "Revival of the Northeast" (zhenxing dongbei) is easily comprehensible. 68 See Weihu shehui wending diaoyan wenji, p. 10; and "Nongmin lingxiu", pp. 8-31.
with poor agricultural economies and the Northeastern rust belt are particularly prominent. Source: Same as Figure 1 . Note: Due to limits on data, only protests and sects with information on the places of occurrence are coded by provinces.
Regional variations are found with regard to religious protest as well. A few provinces accounted for the major part of religious protests that took place during 1981-2005 (see Table 5 ). Shaanxi alone witnessed 177 protests, more than the rest of the country combined, mostly by the followers of the Disciples Association.
69 Zhejiang and Beijing ranked second (71) and third (41), mostly because of followers of the Shouters Faction and Falun Gong, respectively. 70 The provinces with a moderate number of protests include Shandong, Hebei, Hunan, and Henan. As the government tightened its leash on Falun Gong in Beijing, members in Hebei and Shandong became most active. Along with Shandong, Henan was also a strong base for underground Christianity and Hunan was a hotbed for "heretical sects".
71
As with CoPSI, criminal groups have been active in almost every province. Nevertheless, organized crime has plagued some provinces more than others, creating zones of vulnerability that run from the southeast coast (Guangdong and Guangxi), radiates to the southwest (Yunnan and Sichuan) and the central China Both Henan and Hunan have a large rural population that has suffered from agricultural stagnation for years. This large discontented rural population is fertile soil for the revival of Christianity in Henan where it was propagated by Western Christian missionaries several centuries ago. It has also catalyzed the birth of numerous unofficial religious groups in Hunan where local sects have a long history.
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While Hunan and the three northeast provinces are ranked very high in terms of officialgangster collusion, Guangdong and Sichuan's ranking with regard to a political-criminal nexus is relatively low. In contrast, Henan is ranked high in terms of both the number of criminal groups and official-gangster collusion.
center to keep Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, and Yunnan from colluding with international criminal groups. Third, such giant provinces as Henan, Hunan, Hubei and Sichuan with prevalent governance crises tend to create more space for criminal groups to infiltrate.
Horizontal Linkages and Interconnectedness: A Fatal Recipe?
The discussion so far suggests that collective protests have increased in frequency, expanded in size and geographical coverage, lasted longer and involved higher levels of violence. Furthermore, collective protests are often concomitant with the activity of religious and criminal groups. The upward trend of social instability is further confirmed by other indicators such as the frequency of complaint-filing and the number of labor disputes. 74 If history is any guide, this upward trend appears ominous as China's past is replete with instances of peasant insurgencies. 75 Yet it should be noted that isolated cases of protest are unlikely to generate serious impact on the regime. The issues of intra-organizational tightness, inter-regional (lateral) linkages and interconnectedness among collective protests, religious groups and criminal organizations are crucial.
CoPSI are becoming more tightly organized. Many CoPSI are led by assembly-line managers, unionists, labor activists, former cadres, teachers or clan leaders. In the well-known case of Hunan's Daolin Incident in 1999, forty-six leaders organized over 5,000 peasants. 76 Participants of CoPSI often utilize such titles as "peasant delegations for complaint-filing" (nongmin shangfangtuan), "associations for retired workers' complaint-filing" (tuixiu gongren shangfang xiehui) and "anti-corruption brigades" (fan fubai dadui). 77 The enhanced level of organization accounts for the durability of some CoPSI: many recent CoPSI have lasted for several days despite armed suppression by the public security forces.
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In the past, CoPSI had been largely fragmented and isolated incidents devoid of common platforms and lateral networks. While there might have been some "contagion effects" in operation among small towns within a county, cross- provincial spread of disorder was virtually non-existent. 79 Recently, however, increased concerns have been voiced about lateral linkages among CoPSI. According to a 1999 report, inter-regional connections (kua diqu huanlian) and inter-sectoral correspondences were detected in many recent cases. The presence of inter-regional protests in some ethnic minority regions was also suspected.
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Religious organizations exhibit a similar trend. The underground Catholic church, some family churches and large "heretical sects" such as the Disciples Association and the Established King Faction have maintained hierarchical organizations across geographical boundaries, independent of state control. The underground Catholic church has the oldest and best organized nationwide networks. In 1989, for instance, archbishops of the underground church in different regions met in Shaanxi to form a national conference for pro-Vatican archbishops. 81 Major Buddhist, Daoist and folk religious sects also maintain hierarchical organizations. The Shouters Faction, the Lord God Sect, the Spirit Church, Falun Gong, Zhong Gong and Xiang Gong developed hierarchical linkages between their provincial and local branches. Ziran Zhong Gong was active in nine provinces and Cibei (Compassion) Gong stretched across three. The Shouters Faction maintained four tiers by setting up regional and local branches, enabling it to expand to 360 cities in 20 provinces at its peak. underground denominations in Henan met to achieve a common theological understanding and build ties with the overseas church.
84
The case of Falun Gong demonstrates how much of a challenge a determined sect with horizontal linkages can pose to the state. 85 With a four-tiered and nationwide organization, Falun Gong has launched numerous protests. Even after it was outlawed, the sect's faithful staged at least two dozen protests between 1999 and 2000. 86 Even now Falun Gong operates underground. It clandestinely recruits new members and maintains nationwide networks. In 2003, public security authorities cracked 570 cases related to Falun Gong and dismantled over 120 groups in Hebei Province, 100 cases and 11 groups in Shanxi, 83 cases and 31 groups in Jiangxi, and 84 cases and 9 groups in Guizhou. 87 Many independent religious organizations, including the Shouters Faction, the Established King, the Lord God Sect and the Disciples Association, hold views hostile to the state for not allowing them to express their faith and view official religious associations as mere puppets. Reportedly, in 1995, the Chinese Mainland Administrative Knowledge Station (zhonghua dalu xingzheng zhishizhan) printed 9 million leaflets calling for an overthrow of the existing "Satanic authority" (that is, the Communist regime) in China. It mobilized over 1,000 members to distribute the leaflets in 69 cities of 20 provinces. In 1999, two evangelists of the Lord God Sect also organized peasants to resist the collection 84 of grain and taxes in Hunan. 88 The cross-regional organization of independent sects and churches is a concern for the state and prompts the authorities to crack down on them frequently and harshly. 89 Criminal organizations have also increasingly created lateral networks. During 1999-2002, more than 227 criminal groups were dismantled in Kaifeng alone, most of which were associated with the dominant Liang Shengli group that provided protection for them. 90 Although a national criminal syndicate does not seem to have yet been forged, efforts to coordinate criminal activities across regions have not been rare. In Sichuan, for instance, members of one criminal group in Yibin were able to obtain help from another group in Chengdu to get a safe haven for hiding. 91 There are some indications that ringleaders are seeking to form a national syndicate. 92 While collective protestors, religious sects and criminal organizations are all forming lateral networks, a more critical-and perhaps fatal-variable is the "interconnectedness" among these three sources of instability. Popular protest may get entangled with religious beliefs and anti-state rituals, as in the cases of the White Lotus and the Taiping Rebellions. Given that CoPSI frequency seems connected with the prevalence of intense religious activities in Henan, Hunan, Hubei and Zhejiang, such entanglement may be a crucial factor in facilitating provincial variations in organized protest. 93 When coupled with the hollowing out of the local state apparatus in the stagnant countryside, the collusion of religious and criminal forces generates great danger for the regime. Surveys in the countryside of Henan, for instance, suggest that religion is competing with and in few areas even gradually replacing township and village governments as an institution with legitimacy, popular support, and the reputation of helping those in need. In these areas, an increasing number of peasants and even cadres have turned away from local governments.
Once converted, they have often resisted the procurement of state grains, tax collection and birth control. 94 In a few places religious sects, criminal forces and kinship networks at the grassroots level interconnect. 95 In the border region of Henan, Anhui and northern Jiangsu, shamanism and religious cults, revived kinship organizations and flourishing criminal groups appear to be converging to resist central state power on one hand and to capture local state authority on the other. 96 Some evidence suggests that "heretical sects" have engaged in criminal activities. Activists of Zhong Gong, the Disciples Association, the Lord God Sect, the Established King Faction, Oriental Lightning, Children of God and the Dami Mission have been accused of one or more of the following crimes-embezzling donations by their followers, gaining followers through coercion, sex, or blackmail, torturing believers, engaging in polygamy and inducing suicides. 97 Criminal gangs involve themselves in collective protests as both supporters and suppressors. Where such groups have captured the local state, they sometimes enforce a corrupt order that erodes state legitimacy. In other cases, they organize mobs to resist law enforcement (such as tax collection and birth control) and to stop the reach of legitimate state power. 98 The armed standoff and the eventual downfall of Pingyuan (Yunnan) in 1992 and Daqiu (Tianjin) in 1993 94 illustrated how "local dark forces" take over grass-roots communities and turned them into "mud fortresses" to challenge state power.
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Legitimacy, Conflict and Governance Crisis
The debate on China's "(in)stability" has attracted the attention of many China specialists for over a decade. 100 The collapse of the Soviet Union offers a sobering case of failed governance in the face of communal resistance. In fact, the demise of the Soviet empire was foreseen by a few as the gap between its external strength and internal weakness widened. 101 Much research has been done by Chinese scholars in their desperate efforts to avoid repeating the mistakes that Moscow made. Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has sought to raise its regulatory and governance capacity in order to maintain both growth and stability. Efforts have been made to milk more out of the provincial purses, to tighten control over the regions, to fight corruption and grass-roots crimes and to limit the spread of unorthodox ideas and beliefs. 102 Despite these efforts, all three forms of resistance have flourished recently. For the weak and the lost in China, CoPSI is their groaning, religious sects their 99 opium, and organized crime "a stepladder of social ascent". 103 In reaction, the Party can depict localized rebellions as a threat to the common good. In efforts to defend its claims to sovereignty, the Chinese government often tolerates some protests over explosive events and issues, such as the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999 and Japan's whitewashing of war crimes in 2005. On the other hand, it also discourages demonstrations over more delicate issues (such as the EP-3 incident in 2001) or when the movement is about to spin out of control and get tangled up with social grievances (as in the case of anti-Japanese protests after mid-April 2005). 104 Granted that discontents alone would not fundamentally alter the political landscape, they can still serve as a strong catalyst to prod the Chinese state to search for effective solutions. City-based democracy movements may provide hitherto impossible bridges between rural and urban protests, thereby crossing the regional and stratum-based boundaries. 105 What remains unclear at this point concerns the question of whether the frequency and intensity of CoPSI occurrences are in any way connected to the particular provinces' historical proclivities for uprising and instability. 106 Will learning save the Communist state from a blighted future? A wide range of measures that Beijing has been implementing to sustain stability-from canceling agricultural taxes to centralizing the control of public security forces (gongan jizhonghua)-have thus far been fairly successful in containing collective protests. 107 However, while the state is not in immediate danger of collapse, continuing instability is highly likely, particularly in such high-risk provinces as Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Sichuan.
Overall, the current regime remains quite strong, as demonstrated by its effective dismantling of Falun Gong. As the Leviathan state has become equipped with better means of control, however, peasants and workers have also come to 103 enjoy more advanced weapons of the weak-most recently, the Internet and mobile phones. 108 The strategy of "going global" adopted by protesters, as well as criminals, has socialized the conflicts into the international community and further complicated the situation. To what extent the measures currently used will continue to contain unrest remains to be seen.
